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INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 000110

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, EXBS FOR J. HARTSHORN, INL FOR A. BUHLER
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018-12-22
TAGS: [PBTS](#) [ASEC](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [UZ](#)
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: INSPECTION OF BORDER CROSSING POINTS IN ANDIJON

CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, P/E Office; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

¶1. (C) On January 20, Poloff and Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Assistant traveled to the Ferghana Valley to inspect EXBS and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Program-funded equipment provided to the Border Guards of the National Security Service. The equipment is located at Keskener and Ming-Tepa border crossing points in Andijon Province on Uzbekistan's border with Kyrgyzstan. (Note: Keskener and Ming-Tepa hold two of the four modular shelter complexes that EXBS and INL provided and assembled in 2006-2007. The range of equipment at each multi-room complex includes workstations, a refrigerator, oven, bookshelves, cabinets, lockers, beds, and more. End note.)

Keskener Border Crossing Point

¶2. (C) Emboffs travelled first to Keskener border crossing point at the eastern tip of Andijon Province, where they met with Border Guards Captain Jumakulov. Oddly, the Border Guards delayed Emboffs' inspection of the infrastructure and equipment until the official who had signed for these in 2006 arrived. Emboffs accounted for virtually all of the equipment EXBS and INL had provided (with the exception of one mirror) and found it to be in good condition. Some of the equipment in fact appeared to be in such good condition that it may not be regularly used. Emboffs inspected a pristine electric oven and an empty refrigerator. The Border Guards admitted that they did not use the stove for cooking (just for "heating things up"), and only put items in the refrigerator when the weather is warmer. (Comment: The brick building adjacent to the complex, from which one Border Guard emerged with a container of hot water, may have some redundant facilities and equipment. Other parts of the complex, such as the shower stalls, the workstations, chairs, and cabinets were clearly well-used, however. End comment.) Captain Jumakulov praised the equipment as very useful and creating good conditions for those serving there. The complex appeared to lack sufficient electricity to power all of its lights, however. The central hallway and at least two rooms were lit, but the kitchen had only a flickering light while other rooms were shrouded in darkness. (Comment: In addition to apparent power shortages at this facility, the opposition website [uznews.net](#) reported on January 23 that residential areas in Andijon are currently receiving power for 12-14 hours a day. End comment.)

¶3. (C) Jumakulov proved to be generally reticent when Poloff asked him questions about the border crossing point. Jumakulov vaguely responded that the number of people transiting Keskener varies, but a greater number transits in the summer and spring. (Note: 2007 Embassy files indicate that daily pedestrian traffic at Ming-Tepa and Keskener are 2,500-3,000 and 10,000-15,000 respectively, however. End note.) Roughly the same number of people transits back and forth, he continued. No items of proliferation concern or contraband have been seized. (Comment: This seems unlikely. End comment.) Agencies represented at the border crossing point include the Border Guards and the State Customs Committee. Jumakulov refused to comment on the number of personnel serving there. (Note: Poloff counted at least 18 uniformed personnel at the point, however. End note.) Personnel serve varied terms ranging from a few months to a few years, and cooperate with their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan, but Jumakulov did not elaborate on this. Officials at Keskener had trained both in Tashkent and had on-the-job training at the post.

Ming-Tepa Border Crossing Point

¶4. (C) The Border Guards then escorted Emboffs to Ming-Tepa border crossing point. Here again, Emboffs accounted for virtually all of the equipment originally provided, and it was in good condition and was clearly being used. In contrast to Keskener, the entire complex was well-lit and Emboffs found food in the refrigerator and a kettle on the oven. Poloff began to pose questions to Captain Pirmukhamedov similar to those he had asked at Keskener. Captain Jumakulov interrupted, however, stating that Pirmukhamedov was his subordinate and would not have any new information related to Poloff's questions.

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Comment:

¶5. (C) Though appreciative of the equipment, the Border Guards of the National Security Service were guarded and shared little information about border security efforts at Uzbekistan's border with Kyrgyzstan. Our interactions with them underscored that Uzbekistan views much information related to Uzbekistan's borders as highly sensitive. Indeed, multiple recent inquiries related to border security conveyed via diplomatic note to the GOU have gone unanswered. This contrasted with the relatively open discussions

with the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Ferghana Province the
following day (septel).
NORLAND

To view the entire SMART message, go to URL http://repository.state.sgov.gov/_layouts/OSS_SearchResults.aspx?k=messageid:16ffa897-aaab-49d4-86